Both sales campaigns are paused right now. The only thing running is a $1/day page-like campaign.
| Metric | July | August | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spend | $299.03 | $564.36 | $863.39 |
| CPM | $37.50 | $149.82 | $73.53 |
| Outbound CTR | 2.06% | 5.47% | — |
| Website visitors | 80 | 159 | 239 |
| Add to cart | 6 | 9 | 15 |
| Real sales | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Forget CPM for a moment. The only cost that matters is what one website visitor costs.
The two campaigns had opposite problems and landed in the same bad place. July got a decent CPM but the creative turned only 10 of every 1,000 views into a visitor. August fixed the creative — 42 per 1,000, 4.2× better — but delivery cost exploded.
Put August’s creative on July’s delivery cost and a visitor costs about 75 cents instead of $3.55. A 4.7× improvement that has never once been tested.
| Campaign | Platform | CPM |
|---|---|---|
| Page-like campaign (live today) | $15.12 | |
| July sales campaign | $31.15 | |
| August sales campaign | $179.67 | |
| August sales campaign | $252.60 |
The $150–250 CPM is a setting, not a market price. It comes from asking Meta to optimise for Purchase on a pixel that has never seen one, then splitting $100/day four ways so no ad set can ever learn. Same account, same page, same week.
| Metric | Benchmark | NEXEDGE | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| CPM, wellness | $14–22 | $149.82 | 8× over |
| CTR, supplements | 1.01% | 5.47% | 5.4× better |
| Cost per purchase | $45.62 | ∞ | zero sales |
| Category CAC | $68–84 | — | the target |
The creative is the best-performing part of this business. The problem sits either side of it: how the ads are delivered, and what happens after the click.
| Offer | Price | Contribution | Break-even CVR |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 bottle | $69 | $51.23 | 1.95% |
| Subscription | $49/mo | $31.93 | 3.13% |
| 2 bottles | $109 | $80.98 | 1.24% |
| 3 bottles | $149 | $110.73 | 0.90% |
A normal cold-traffic store converts 1.4–1.8%. The bundles clear that. The single bottle does not. At 1.5% conversion and $1 per visitor, a sale costs $67 — profitable on the 2- and 3-bottle, and a $15 loss on every single bottle sold.
The product page still defaults to “One-time, $69” — the one option that loses money. Changing the default variant to the 2-bottle costs nothing and is the cheapest profit fix on this entire list.
Raised 24 Jul, 4 Aug, 6 Aug, 7 Aug. Checked again today — it has got worse, not better.
| Page | Claim |
|---|---|
| Home | “Rated 5.0” + 4 testimonials dated Mar 2025 – Jan 2026 |
| Product | “Excellent 4.9 | 1,422” |
| /the-reviews | “4.8/5, 1,200+ verified reviews” — dated back to Nov 2024 |
The store launched July 2026. The pixel was created 11 June 2026. There have been zero real orders, ever.
Delete every fabricated rating and testimonial, on all three pages.
The product page shows Visa, Mastercard, Amex, Discover, Apple Pay, Google Pay and Shop Pay. As of the 7 Aug meeting, “get the credit-card gateway approved” was still an open priority — meaning live checkout was PayPal-only while the page advertised eight methods. That would explain 3 checkouts started, 0 completed. Older American men buying a $69 supplement want to use a card.
Place one real order with a real credit card, end to end. If it fails, no amount of ad optimisation produces a sale and the creative budget conversation is premature.
Unless it changed since the launch QC: all 9 Klaviyo flows are drafts, the popup is a draft, and subscriber sync is unchecked. This category needs 3–4 touches over 3–14 days before someone buys. Right now 100% of the 239 visitors who didn’t buy are gone forever. Turning it on is free.
| Ad | Spend | Cost / ATC | CTR |
|---|---|---|---|
| “Came Off TRT. Didn’t Go Back To Nothing” | $113.20 | $22.64 | 6.81% |
| 3D Pixar — “Most men focus” | $50.27 | $25.14 | 10.92% |
| “Not Ready For TRT” | $135.45 | $33.86 | 5.88% |
| “I Didn’t Tell Her I Started Taking Anything” | $120.89 | $60.45 | 9.50% |
The TRT angle is the whole account: 9 of 15 lifetime add to carts on 32% of the spend. Everything else is noise. The winning ad is clean, premium, headline does the work, product is the hero. It is a good ad. It is switched off.
| Ad | Spend | ATC | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| UGC — “5 weeks in, my wife noticed” | $68.95 | 0 | CPM $391.76 — worst in account |
| “No More 3PM Wall” | $59.54 | 0 | CTR 0.90% |
| “She Noticed First” | $45.03 | 0 | CTR 0.97% |
| “She Doesn’t Just Miss Date Night” | $32.24 | 0 | CPM $260 |
| + 7 more | ~$81 | 0 | — |
The UGC video appears to show the wrong product. In the Instagram preview the creator is holding a short, wide, black plastic tub. NEXEDGE is a tall amber glass bottle with a black cap. Those are not the same object.
It would explain the result exactly: 9.66% click rate — the hook works — then zero add to carts, because people land, see a different product, and leave. Open the file and check the frame. It takes ten seconds.
This matters far beyond one video, because the plan on the table is to spend $2,000/month buying 15–20 more from the same pipeline.
And 6 ads never served a single impression. Same as July. A third of the “test” never actually ran.
You cannot manufacture trust. You borrow it. Six ways, ranked by what NEXEDGE can do this month.
The plan on the table is 15–20 UGC videos a month at ~$2,000. I would not do that, and the account’s own data says why.
| Angle | Spend | Add to cart |
|---|---|---|
| TRT — tried it, came back | $276 | 9 |
| Wife noticed | $226 | 2 |
| Systemic depletion | $171 | 1 |
| Anti fairy-dusting | $66 | 1 |
| 3PM wall | $60 | 0 |
Twenty videos on weak angles is twenty expensive failures. Five on the TRT angle is the test.
| Asset | How many | Cost | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advertorial / pre-sell page | 1 | writing time | Biggest lever here |
| Founder video + the lab | 1 | ~$0 | Nobody can copy it |
| Statics, TRT angle | 4–5 | low | 13 of 15 ATCs came from statics |
| UGC — real users, not actors | 3 | ~$600 | Fix the brief: right bottle, men 38–50 |
| Total | 6–8 | — | Not 20. All on proven angles |
Billo-style marketplaces at $150–250 a video give you exactly what you got: a stranger reading a script, holding the wrong jar. The better route is slower and cheaper — find 3–5 real men aged 38–50 who match the buyer, send free product, pay a small fee for honest footage after 30 days of real use. The specificity converts (“I’m 44, I run a business, week three is when I noticed”), and the same people give you the real reviews the site needs. Run them from the creator’s own handle where possible — partnership ads beat brand-account content.
Every ad points straight at the product page. For cold, sceptical traffic on an unknown $69 brand that is the hardest possible ask. The category evidence is unambiguous: a pre-sell page converts 2–3× better than a product page, and in one documented case the same ads pointed at an advertorial cut CAC nearly in half.
NEXEDGE already has the raw material written — the systemic-depletion story, the anti-fairy-dusting argument, “your bloodwork says fine, you don’t”, the lab ownership. It is a writing job, not a media buy. One page. This is Jia Yi’s highest-value task this month.
Build the advertorial page, the founder video, and 4–5 TRT-angle statics. Then launch exactly like this:
Verified: the pixel is not caught by Meta’s health-and-wellness restrictions, so Add-To-Cart optimisation is genuinely available.
Let it run 10–14 days. Roughly $1,500 total. Do not touch it mid-flight — rebuilding resets nothing, and every restart so far has opened higher than the last one closed.
This gate cannot be judged honestly until the store is fixed. Fake reviews and a possibly-broken card checkout cap conversion near zero no matter what the ads do. Judging the offer on the current store would convict the wrong thing.
Stop trying to win on the first purchase. That is not how this category is built in the US.
So the business works if and only if people re-order. Which changes what gets measured: CAC, subscription take-up and 60-day repurchase — not day-three ROAS.
NEXEDGE cannot yet afford to play the pure LTV game. There is no cash cushion and zero proven retention. So the sequence has to be: get CAC to roughly break even on the bundle → prove one cohort actually re-orders → then scale, and let months 2–12 be the profit.
Skipping to step three is how supplement brands die with a warehouse full of stock.